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The Influence of Legal Education
on Moral Reasoning
Sandra JanofE*
INTRODUCTION
Male educators developed traditional legal education for
male students. Law school student populations, however, are
no longer exclusively, or even predominantly, male. Today,
42.5% of law students are women.' While feminist scholars call
for the inclusion of a woman's perspective in rethinking legal
education,2 very few studies have, to date, explored legal educa-
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1. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND AD-
MISSIONS TO THE BAR, A REvIEw OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FALL, 1990, LAw SCHOOLS AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 66 (1990) [here-
inafter REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION]. Of the 127,261 students in law schools
across the nation in the 1990-91 academic year, 54,097, or 42.5%, were women.
Id This is a slight decrease from the 1989-90 academic year, the year of this
study, in which 42.7% of all law students were women. Id At Temple Univer-
sity School of Law, the population for this study, 46.8% of the students were
women. Data on file with the Temple University School of Law Office of Aca-
demic Affairs, Development, & Planning.
2. See generally 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1-183 (1988) (issue dedicated to "Wo-
men in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice"). In particu-
lar, for a listing of representative feminist writings, see Carrie Menkel-
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tion from the perspective of female law students.3 This Article
presents the results of a study that included the experiences of
women in its investigation of the impact of legal education on
moral reasoning.
The study first examined the moral reasoning of students
about to enter law school, then reexamined their reasoning at
the end of their first year of law school. The study was
designed to explore whether legal education changes students'
moral perspective, and if so, whether it affects the perspectives
of men and women differently. The study demonstrated that
the first year of law school has an insignificant effect on men's
moral reasoning but a substantial impact on women's moral
reasoning.
The study began with the fundamental assumption that
there are two different, equally valid, moral decision-making
perspectives. 4 One perspective, rights-oriented moral reason-
ing, focuses on justice, rights, and equality issues. Rights-ori-
ented thinkers view people as separate entities entitled to fair
Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education
or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law Schoo4" 38 J. LEGAL EDuC. 61, 63 n.1O (1988).
3. A few studies have, however, reported on women's experiences in law
school; see Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to be
Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61
TEMP. L.Q. 799 (1988) (reporting results of five-school study of female law
professors); James R. Elkins, Rites de Passage: Law Students "Telling their
Lives," 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1985) (excerpting law students' journals); James
C. Foster, Antigones in the Bar: Women Lawyers as Reluctant Adversaries, 10
LEGAL STUD. F. 287 (1986) (presenting the results of interviews with female
law students which indicate that the legal system's adversarial approach con-
flicts with many women's care-oriented approach to moral reasoning); Geor-
gina W. LaRussa, Portia's Decision: Women's Motives for Studying Law and
Their Later Career Satisfaction as Attorneys, 1 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 350
(1977) (finding that female attorneys reporting career satisfaction were moti-
vated to study law by realistic expectations of practical benefits from a legal
career, were confident that fulfillment could be found through work in law,
and were interested in the theoretical aspects of legal study); Janet Taber et
al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of
Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209 (1988) (reporting
on a study of experiences in law school and in legal careers of male and female
students and graduates of Stanford Law School); Catherine Weiss & Louise
Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988)
(documenting alienation experienced by 20 female students at Yale Law
School); see also ScoTT TuRow, ONE L: AN INSIDE AcCOuNT OF LIFE IN THE
FIRsT YEAR AT HARVARD LAw SCHOOL (1977) (biographical account of first
year of law school).
4. Philosopher Carol Gilligan first advanced this thesis. See infra text
accompanying notes 47-54. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (advanc-
ing this thesis).
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treatment and believe that conditions that promote inequality
create fundamental injustice.
The other perspective, care-oriented moral reasoning, fo-
cuses on care, interdependence, and response to need. Those
who adopt this perspective see people as interconnected and be-
lieve that people should avoid hurting others. Problems, for
care ethicists, emerge under conditions that promote potential
fractures in relationships.
The notion that there are two orientations available to peo-
ple when they face moral choices challenges most scholars' un-
derstanding of moral reasoning. Traditional moral
development theory describes an individual's moral develop-
ment as a linear progression toward an increased use of objec-
tive principles of justice. On this theory, care-oriented
reasoning typifies an intermediate stage of reasoning short of
mature moral decision making.
Lawrence Kohlberg first posited this view in 1958, basing it
on studies conducted solely with male subjects.5 Critics subse-
quently charged that the fact that women scored lower than
men on Kohlberg's test indicated that his theory and methodol-
ogy were biased.6 Philosopher Carol Gilligan, for example, con-
tends that a theory based on an exclusively male study will
subordinate the traditionally feminine values of connectedness,
care, and circumstance to the traditionally masculine values of
rationality, individuality, objectivity, and hierarchy.7 This criti-
cism is supported by research demonstrating that women are
more likely to use the care perspective, while men are more
likely to use the justice, or rights, perspective in moral decision
5. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking
and Choice in the Years 10 to 16 (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Chicago).
6. The authors of two studies, for example, criticized Kohlberg's test be-
cause it implied that men's moral reasoning was more advanced than women's.
Kay Bussey & Betty Maughan, Gender Differehces in Moral Reasoning, 42 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 701, 704 (1982) (finding that women tend
to be at stage three and men at stage four, but that men's level of moral rea-
soning dropped to stage three when judged by a hypothetical involving a fe-
male protagonist); Constance B. Holstein, Irreversible, Stepwise Sequence in
the Development of Moral Judgment: A Longitudinal Study of Males and Fe-
males, 47 CHILD DEv. 51, 59 (1976) (finding that women tend to reason at stage
three and men at stage four).
7. In her book, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 4, Gilligan broke with
traditional methodology by asking women about real-life struggles as opposed
to hypothetical dilemmas. Moreover, she viewed women as enmeshed in a web
of issues, rather than deciding in the abstract between right and wrong.
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making.8
Concurrently, a change has taken place in the legal profes-
sion. The legal profession historically has been white, upper-
middle class, and male-dominated, but within the past ten years
the profession's demographics have changed considerably. Wo-
men made up only 8% of law school students in the 1970s; thus,
the swell to today's 42.5% has been dramatic.9 Moreover, today
18.1% of the legal work force is composed of women, up from
4.7% in the 1970s.10 This increase in the number of female law-
yers is not altogether surprising, as it reflects the shifts in fam-
ily and work-role definitions that have taken place in the past
twenty years."3 Yet, to date, few studies of what it means to be
a lawyer-to act or think like a lawyer-have reflected the ex-
perience of women.' 2
This study broadened the range of previous investigation
into the areas of both moral and legal reasoning by including
the voices of women. This Article presents the study in four
parts. Part I introduces the scholarship that supports this re-
search with respect to moral reasoning theory, the role of the
lawyer and legal reasoning, the first year of legal education,
and women as law students. Part II presents the questions that
guided this research and describes the study's methodology, in-
cluding the population and sample, the sources of data collec-
tion, and the analysis procedures. Part III presents the study's
results, interprets the results, and discusses the implications of
those results for legal education. Part IV recommends topics
for future research.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THEORIES OF MORAL REASONING
Sigmund Freud offered the first comprehensive theory of
moral development.' 3 He also established the practice, fol-
lowed by later developmentalists, of using male experience as
8. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text; MAPPING THE MORAL
DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND EDUCATION (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
9. REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 66.
10. 1&
11. See MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN, AND
MORALS 458-69 (1985).
12. See supra note 3 (listing studies reporting on the perspectives and ex-
periences of women in law school).
13. See THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey trans., ed., 1966).
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the norm for human behavior. Freud's oedipal conflict, the
male child's emotional upheaval in early childhood, illustrated
his theory that repression of forbidden desires leads to an inter-
nalized understanding of right and wrong.14 Instead of explor-
ing the difference between male and female children's
experiences, Freud interpreted female children's developmen-
tal differences as developmental failures. Freud claimed that
women "show less sense of justice than men, ... are less ready
to submit to the great exigencies of life .... [and] are more
often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or
hostility."' 5 Subsequent theorists, including Jean Piaget and
Kohlberg, also have tended to view women's moral characters
as less fully developed than men's.
Piaget's observations of young children playing with mar-
bles led him to link moral growth with the development of cog-
nitive processes. He observed that boys, more often than girls,
made and followed rules as they played.16 When conflicts
arose, boys made objective decisions based on fairness.17 In
contrast, he noted, girls were "less concerned.with legal elabo-
rations. A rule is good so long as the game repays it."' 8
Piaget assumed that the ideal morality was based on equal-
ity and reciprocity. Piaget's observations thus supported
Freud's conclusion that girls' moral development was less
complete:
The most superficial observation is sufficient to show that in the main
the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys. We did
not succeed in finding a single collective game played by girls in
which there were as many rules and, above all, as fine and consistent
an organization and codification of these rules as in the game of mar-
bles described above. 19
Kohlberg's theory of moral development expanded Piaget's
scheme and explained the organized growth of moral reason-
14. Freud claimed that boys have the opportunity to resolve their oedipal
conflicts completely through psychological separation from their mothers and
gender-identification with their fathers. SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY
LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 114 (James Strachey trans., ed., 1964). On the
other hand, Freud maintained, girls do not completely resolve their corre-
sponding conflicts. The forbidden wish that precipitates girls' conflicts, their
"penis envy," he held, is never fully repressed, just weakened. Id-
15. 19 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
OF SIGMUND FREUD 257-58 (James Strachey trans., ed., 1966).
16. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie
Gabain trans., 1965).
17. Id. at 29-76.
18. Id- at 83.
19. Id- at 77.
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ing.20 Collecting empirical data over a fifteen-year period from
eighty-four boys, Kohlberg hypothesized a six-stage model of
moral development.2 1 Moral growth, according to Kohlberg,
consists of progress through a sequenbe of stages. Progress
from one stage to the next results from learning how to resolve
moral dilemmas. Moreover, he explained, "stages define... to-
tal ways of thinking, not attitudes toward particular situa-
tions. '22 The moral concern at each stage-a person's view of
what is right-shifts as the maturing individual develops a dif-
ferent view of self in relation to others. Kohlberg founded his
stage theory on the assumption that moral development shifts
toward an integrated sense of universal justice23
20. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOP-
MENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981).
21. Kohlberg's original dissertation study collected responses to hypothet-
ical moral dilemmas from eighty-four 10-, 12-, and 16-year-old boys. Kohlberg,
supra note 5. Kohlberg validated his original hypotheses in a longitudinal
study of the sample. Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION
THEORY AND RESEARCH 347 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969). Kohlberg's theory has
undergone revision over the years in response to criticism. See, e.g., Charles
Levine et al., The Current Formulation of Kohlberg's Theory and a Response
to Critics, 28 HUM. DEv. 94, 97 (1985).
22. KOHLBERG, supra note 20, at 120.
23. Kohlberg defined six stages grouped into three levels. Id, at 17-20.
The "preconventional level" comprises the first two stages. At stage one, "the
punishment and obedience orientation," moral behavior is motivated by fear of
punishment. Behaviors that are punished are bad and are to be avoided, while
behaviors that are rewarded are good, without regard to value. At stage two,
"the instrumental relativist orientation," moral development is motivated by
fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing. "I'll scratch your back if you scratch
mine" characterizes this stage, and a rule is seen as fair if it treats everyone
equally. Right action has more to do with getting what one needs than with
avoiding punishment. Id
The second level is the "conventional level" and comprises stages three
and four. At stage three, "the interpersonal concordance or 'good boy-nice
girl' orientation," moral behavior is motivated by a desire to maintain group
membership-that is, to help, please, or get approval from others. Being
"right" at this level consists of being "nice," being concerned about other peo-
ple and their feelings, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.
At stage four, "society maintaining orientation," moral behavior is motivated
by law and order. "Right behavior" means following the rules and respecting
authority, regardless of whether it will garner approval from others. While a
stage three reasoner will follow rules to get approval, a stage four reasoner
will do so to maintain social order. In both the preconventional and the con-
ventional level modes of thinking, the specific rules themselves are external
and imposed. A third-level, or post-conventional reasoner, on the other hand,
values the principles apart from individual or group authority. Id
The third level is the "postconventional or principled level" and comprises
stages five and six. At stage five, "the social contract orientation," moral be-
havior is motivated by the values and legal contracts of a society, not just its
[Vol. 76:193
LEGAL EDUCATION
Kohlberg's view of justice as the central moral concern was
based on the Platonic view of the nature of virtue. Kohlberg
believed that "virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is al-
ways the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture ....
The name of this ideal form is justice."24 Kohlberg's theory of
moral development has been the basis for an enormous amount
of educational and psychological research.2 Critics attacked
Kohlberg's theory from the start,26 but most scholars have ac-
cepted his theory as the explanation of the moral development
of all people, male and female.
In the 1970s, women began to challenge traditional inter-
pretations of female experience. Female scholars searched for
their own understanding of women's history,27 and feminist
psychologists explored alternative views of female develop-
ment.2s The women's movement also gained political influ-
ence.2 While the women's movement initially insisted on the
fundamental similarity and equality of women and men,30 its
concrete rules and laws. At this stage, rules and rights become moral princi-
ples which are objectively fair and just. At stage six, "the universal ethical
principle orientation," justice is seen as a universal principle governing all
judgments and behavior. At this stage, right is defined by one's conscience and
by principles that are universal, rather than in relation to persons, events, or
institutions. "At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reci-
procity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human
beings as individuals." Id.
Recently, Kohlberg admitted that there was no empirical validation for
stage six. Levine, supra note 21, at 97.
24. KOHLBERG, supra note 20, at 30.
25. See, e.g., ROBERT SELMAN, THE GROWTH OF INTERPERSONAL UNDER.
STANDING (1980). Selman has taken Kohlberg's concept of role-taking as a
critical element in ego development and conducted a series of interrelated
studies to explore the developmental character of social perspectives. See also
ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & CAROL N. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DLFEP,-
ENCES 114-15 (1974) (reporting that 40 studies of sex differences in moral de-
velopment accept Kohlberg's notion of rule-following and justice-seeking as
high-level moral reasoning).
26. See, e.g., Bussey & Maughan, supra note 6, at 704-05 (criticizing
Kohlberg's test on grounds of gender bias); Holstein, supra note 6, at 59-60
(same); cf L. Kohlberg & R. Kramer, Continuitis and Discontinuities in
Childhood and Adult Moral Development, 12 HuM. DEv. 93, 109 (1969) (noting
that Kohlberg's early work shows unexpected regressions threatening the no-
tion of invariance).
27. See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 11; LBERATiNG WOMEN'S HISTORY (Ber-
nice A. Carroll ed., 1976); RETRIEVING WOMEN'S HISTORY (S. Jay Kleinberg ed.,
1988).
28. See infra notes 31-61 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., BARBARA S. DECKARD, THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 359-68 (3d
ed. 1983).
30. See e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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focus soon shifted to examining gender differences that spring
from our male-dominant social structure.
Psychologists Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy Chodorow,
among others, challenged the traditional blueprint of the
American family with their assessments of the sociological and
psychological effects of reserving for women the primary re-
sponsibility for child care and education.3 ' Dinnerstein's
unique insight was that our social structure is built on the as-
sumption that the female is the primary care-taker of infants
and young children.32 Early "mothering" by women influences
learned sex-role differences and reinforces "asymmetrical sex-
ual privilege."33 Dinnerstein explained that male privilege is
maintained because most babies grow into adults who assume
women are mainly in charge of children and men are mainly in
charge of "world making," or the exercise of power.3
Chodorow further developed the theme that placing wo-
men in the mothering role influences female-male relation-
ships. Her significant contribution to feminist psychology was
to explain female ego development and to move away from
Freud's negative description.35 Whereas Freud's masculine bias
held that girls do not fully repress their conflicts between sex-
ual identity and aggression and therefore have weaker ego
boundaries, Chodorow explained that girls, mothered by wo-
men, experience preoedipal relationships which are less ego-
threatening than those experienced by boys.3 6 Because women
develop their gender identities within an ongoing, same-sex re-
lationship, girls do not have to curtail their primary love.37
Male gender identity, on the other hand, requires an emotional
separation from the mother and identification with the father.3 8
As a result, Chodorow postulated, the basic feminine sense of
self is a sense of connectedness, whereas the basic masculine
sense of self is a sense of separateness.39
31. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 3 (1978); DOR-
OTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR 4 (1976). Other works
by feminist psychologists include FRENCH, supra note 11; JEAN B. MILLER, TO-
WARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976); NEL NODDINGS, CARING (1984);
Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342 (1980).
32. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 31, at 28-32.
33. Id. at 76.
34. Id at 82, 85-86.
35. CHODOROW, supra note 31, at 167.
36. IdM
37. Id. at 166.
38. Id. at 166-67.
39. Id. at 169.
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Gilligan's 1982 book, In A Different Voice,40 challenged
Kohlberg's scheme of moral development and broke through
the boundaries of the traditionally accepted research assump-
tions.41 Gilligan did not argue that Kohlberg's rights-oriented
reasoning scheme was wrong. Rather, she attacked his failure
to consider that, because girls' early mother-child relationship
is different than boys', they develop a different set of values.
42
Her model expanded Kohlberg's position by integrating a per-
spective that emerged from her studies of female moral
development.43
Gilligan believed that moral problem solving could best be
understood by studying real, not hypothetical, moral dilem-
mas.44 The Supreme Court's legalization of abortion45 provided
the opportunity; she looked for the relationship between judg-
ment and action by studying twenty-nine pregnant women in
the midst of a decision to continue or abort a pregnancy. In-
stead of asking questions that implied principled considerations
(the Kohlbergian methodology), Gilligan opened the interviews
with a simple directive.46 She encouraged the women to reveal
their thoughts about their pregnancy. As the women spoke,
Gilligan noted that the women used a decision process different
from Kohlberg's rights-oriented reasoning scheme.4 7 She
termed this construction of morality "a different voice."48
Gilligan's study of women uncovered a fundamental differ-
ence between women's and men's perceptions of themselves
and their world. Women view themselves in terms of their con-
nectedness to others. Care and responsibility to others is there-
fore central to their moral thought. Previous researchers had
aligned women with a relational view of themselves and moral-
ity. Gilligan, however, was the first to suggest that this con-
struction was a unique view of social reality not embedded in a
40. GILLIGAN, supra note 4.
41. Id at 18.
42. Id at 18-19.
43. Id at 19.
44. Id at 3.
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Ellen DuBois et al., The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture:
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO
L. REV. 11, 37 (1985) (remarks of Carol Gilligan) (explaining that, while the
women used the language of morality-e.g., "should," "ought," "right," and
"wrong"-their logic was not one of rules and principles).
47. Id.
48. Id at 38.
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hierarchic scheme.49 Based on the results of this and two other
studies,50 she hypothesized two distinct modes of moral
judgment-rights51 and care-and two modes of describing self
in relation to others-separate/objective and connected/
interdependent.52
Nona Lyons tested Gilligan's conclusions and identified the
two characteristic modes of self-description and moral decision
making. In the first mode, "morality of rights," the self is seen
as separate. The relationship is based on reciprocity, that is, on
considering others as you would want to be considered, as in
the golden rule. The assumption is that others are the same as
the self.53 In the second mode, "morality of response and care,"
the self is seen as connected. The relationship is based on in-
terdependence and concern for another's well-being. Consider-
ation of others is contextual and may not promote equality.
Responsiveness means seeing the world through another's eyes.
The assumption, in this mode, is that others are different from
oneself.5
Recent research by D. Kay Johnston,5 5 Carol Gilligan, and
Jane Attanucci- demonstrates that care and rights thinking
are not mutually exclusive moral perspectives. The research
indicates that each orientation has its own psychological logic
and understanding of relationships, and that each addresses dif-
ferent moral concerns.57 Moreover, these studies found that
although a person occasionally uses both rights and care per-
spectives, one orientation tends to predominate. 5s The way peo-
ple construct a moral problem-the way they perceive
49. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self
and of Morality, 47 HARv. EDUC. REV. 481 (1977).
50. The studies were: the College Student Study, involving 25 young adult
women and men; the Abortion Decision Study, involving 29 women ages 15 to
33; and the Rights and Responsibility Study, involving eight men and eight wo-
men at nine points across the life cycle. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 2-3.
51. Kohlberg's schema is referred to as the morality of justice. Carol Gil-
ligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Obligations, in MAPPING THE MORAL DO-
MAIN, supra note 8, at 73, 84-85. Because of the complex notion of justice in
the legal context, this Article uses the term "rights."
52. GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 35-38.
53. Nona P. Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Sel, Relationships, and Moral-
ity, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 8, at 21, 22.
54. Id, at 33-35.
55. D. Kay Johnston, Adolescents' Solutions to Dilemmas in Fables: Two
Moral Orientations-Two Problem Solving Strategies, in MAPPING THE MORAL
DOMAIN, supra note 8, at 49.
56. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 51, at 73.
57. MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 8, at xix-xxiii.
58. Id at xix.
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relationships, relevant issues, and context--determines their
response.5 9 Gilligan has further noted that people tend to si-
lence one voice when making or justifying decisions. 60
Giligan's theory of moral reasoning challenges a myopic
line of moral development theory that ignores fundamental dif-
ferences in perception. Moral maturity, she asserts, means ad-
dressing both rights concerns and care concerns--that is,
looking through both lenses and speaking both languages.6'
B. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER AND LEGAL REASONING
American law, the American legal system, and American
law schools-in a broad sense, the subjects of the study--are
traditionally rights-oriented. The earmarks of Kohlbergian
analysis permeate the American legal system. American law
views individuals as separate and autonomous. The judicial sys-
tem analyzes legal disputes as problems of conflicting claims. 62
Judges interpret preexistent, objective rules and impose them
impartially.63 Legal reasoning also is hierarchical, in that it is
formal, objective, and relies on precedent.
American legal reasoning assumes that there are overarch-
ing legal principles. The facts of a case form the minor premise
of a syllogism; the applicable legal principle constitutes the ma-
jor premise. The American legal system is also hierarchical;
trial court decisions are subject to at least two levels of appel-
late review.
The lawyer's role within the legal structure is to represent
the client-to further the client's values, power, wishes, inten-
tions, and judgments. The principles of partisanship and neu-
trality are fundamental elements in the lawyer-client
relationship. Partisanship requires that the lawyer advocate
the client's interests, while neutrality requires that the lawyer
suspend moral or ethical judgment of the client's position. As a
result, lawyers may assume professional loyalty to concerns
that they find personally objectionable.6
59. See generally A GUIDE TO READING NARRATIVES OF CONFLIcr AND
CHOICE FOR SELF AND MORAL VOICE (Lyn M. Brown ed., 1988) [hereinafter
GUIDE] (presenting a framework for interpreting the logic of care and rights
perspectives in reported real-life dilemmas).
60. MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 8, at xix.
61. 1d at xx.
62. See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1978).
63. RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISIONS AND PROFESSIONAL DE-
CISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 20 (1988).
64. Id- at 27-33.
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The legal system's adversarial nature also reflects its
rights-oriented perspective. Lawyers protect their clients' indi-
vidual autonomy through their commitment to win their cli-
ents' fights. Competition, therefore, is essential to good
lawyering. Traditional legal scholars maintain that these struc-
tural elements and role responsibilities are necessary for a fair
and just judicial process.d5
C. LEGAL EDUCATION-THE FIRST YEAR
This study considered what happens when individuals who
view the world from a relational-care perspective undertake
professional training that is defined from a justice-rights per-
spective. The study hypothesized that the first year of legal
training alters students' moral decision-making processes.66
American law schools generally offer a standard,
mandatory, first-year curriculum that teaches concepts funda-
mental to legal thinking and practice. James Elkins describes
the first year of law school as a powerful, transformative rite of
passage.67 He reports that students quickly come to mistrust
their perceptions of themselves, of lawyers, and of themselves
as lawyers.68 Elkins's studies reveal that students are often
stopped in their tracks by questions about what they are doing,
how the law works, what it "actually" means to practice law,
and how the practice of law will affect their lives.69 The first
year is "at once more and less in reality than it promised to
be." 70
According to John Bonsignore's impassioned description of
law school, within the first few months there is a "vigorous in-
stitutional effort to cut the individual loose from all... psycho-
65. Id. at 31-32.
66. A number of commentators have noted the extraordinary psychologi-
cal impact of law school on students. E.g., TUROW, supra note 3; John J. Bon-
signore, Law Schook Caught in the Paradigmatic Squeeze, in JOHN J.
BONSIGNORE ET AL., BEFORE THE LAW 257 (1984); James R. Elkins, The Quest
for Meaning: Narrative Accounts of Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 577
(1988) [hereinafter Quest for Meaning]; James R. Elkins, Reflections on the
Religion Called Legal Education, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 522 (1987); Elkins, supra
note 3; Foster, supra note 3; James C. Foster, The "Cooling Out" of Law Stu-
dents, 3 LAW & POLICY Q. 243 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2; Andrew
S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of
Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 93 (1968); Weiss & Melling, supra note 3.
67. Elkins, supra note 3, at 28.
68. Id. at 40.
69. Quest for Meaning, supra note 66, at 578.
70. Id.
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social anchoring points."'' T Law school, he says, epitomizes a
clash of competing cultures.72 Law school education creates a
contest of wills between a student's "home world" values-i.e.,
personal morality--and institutional values-i.e., professional
morality.73 Moreover, students who formerly experienced aca-
demic success, self-confidence, freedom of action, and self-ex-
pression are rendered defenseless when strategies for success
no longer work.7 4 Bonsignore argues that "[t]he manifest aim
in all early law school communication is to avoid common un-
derstandings through dialogue and to make the student into a
fool whose past academic life and ways of thought are not only
unhelpful in doing law, but are positively in the way."75
Not only do students become dissatisfied with themselves
and with what they bring from their "home world," but they
also experience an increasing need to succeed in the new sys-
tem. As students come to depend on the teachers, school, and
the system, they become more likely to accept the institution's
demands and values.
D. WOMEN AS LAW STUDENTS
There has, to date, been little research on female law stu-
dents' experiences. Studies of women's experiences in law
school have considered women's reasons for going to law
school, women's participation in classroom activities, and wo-
men's feelings about being advocates in an adversarial legal
process.
Two studies have sought to understand women's reasons
for choosing law as a career. Georgina LaRussa interviewed
forty women and identified eight categories into which their
reasons for attending law school could be grouped.76 Between
twenty and forty percent of the women cited the opportunity
for self-enhancement, stimulation, and self-fulfillment; the de-
sire to be identified as a member of a profession; a theoretical
interest; and the desire to achieve tangible results.77 Two of
the motives for going to law school were cited by more than
fifty percent of the women: the material or practical advantage
71. Bonsignore, supra note 66, at 259.
72. Id- at 258.
73. Id-
74. Id.
75. Bonsignore calls this the mortification process. Id- at 259.
76. LaRussa, supra note 3, at 351-53.
77. Id at 353-55.
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of a law career and the desire to serve society and help others.78
A study by the Gender and Law Project (undertaken by Stan-
ford University law and psychology students) found results con-
sistent with LaRussa's conclusion.79 The study also found that
significantly more women than men indicated a strong desire to
serve society.80
A study conducted at Yale Law School examined why wo-
men choose to remain silent in the classroom more often than
men.8' Catherine Weiss and Louise Melling formed a first-year
women's support group and collected data through extensive
interviews with twenty of its members.82 Women identified
alienation from self, community, the classroom, and the content
of legal education as the primary reasons for their silence.8 3
Weiss and Melling concluded that the disproportionate feeling
of alienation among women was due to gender discrimination.84
The women reported that they felt ignored or mistreated by
some professors.8 5 In addition, women who remained silent
said that they objected to classroom aggression and polarized
win/lose arguments.86
The Yale study's subjects criticized the content of legal ed-
ucation and complained that legal education is suspended in a
midlevel realm of discourse and dissociated from a subjective or
contextual perspective.87 The students maintained that the law
school curriculum was "too theoretical" and indifferent to real-
world issues,88 yet "not theoretical enough" and lacking in ade-
quate "inquiry into the social, historical, political, or economic
underpinnings of the cases."8 9 In addition, the students felt
that acontextual legal thinking, embodied in a language that
shuns the word "I," disaffirms the idea that people construct or
challenge truth.90
The Yale study's subjects suggested that law schools alter
their curriculum to include women and address their exper-
78. Id
79. Taber et al., supra note 3, at 1219.
80. Id.
81. Weiss & Melling, supra note 3, at 1332-45.
82. Id- at 1310.
83. Id, at 1299 (introducing the "four faces of alienation").
84. Id- at 1302.
85. Id at 1334-43.
86. Id at 1339.
87. Id. at 1346.
88. Id-
89. Id at 1347.
90. Id. at 1346.
[Vol. 76:193
LEGAL EDUCATION
iences.9 ' These women advocated closer connections between
students, between students and teachers, and between students
and the people and subjects they study.92
James Foster also explored how women feel about being
advocates in an adversarial legal process.93 Foster interviewed
fourteen female law students.94 He concluded that women in
the legal profession are "reluctant adversaries" who must
choose between risking professional rejection by "articulating
nonadversarial values" and silencing their "women's voice" in
joining the process.95
Foster identified three strategies women use to survive law
school. The women with whom Foster spoke either joined in as
"[one] of the boys," rejected adversariness entirely, or decided
to "[g]rimace and bear it." '96
Foster identified problems inherent in each choice. Wo-
men who adopted the first strategy had to remain silent.97 The
second strategy, which Foster claims is the route taken by
"feminists of one stripe or another," was used by women who
wanted to succeed by redefining success.98 These women risked
being stigmatized "first as women trying to play a man's game;
then as outsiders who want to change the game's rules; and fi-
nally as people who repudiate being stigmatized." 99 The major-
ity of women chose the third strategy.10 0 These women sought
to work within the law school system, resigning themselves to
the adversary game.' 0 ' They did not give up their need to
make meaningful human connections, yet they were not blind
to the fact that "[b]eing a lawyer requires that you just choose
your battle ground."' 0 2
91. Id. at 1356-58.
92. Id- at 1356.
93. Foster, supra note 3.
94. Id at 288.
95. Id- at 306.
96. Id at 290.
97. Id
98. Id-
99. Id.
100. Id
101. Id. at 290-91.
102. Id. at 288-91. The coping strategies used by these female students
were consistent with those that Jack and Jack report were used by the female
lawyers they interviewed. See infra text accompanying notes 173-78. Jack and
Jack's is the only research study to date that asked female and male lawyers
about their struggle with professional dilemmas and listened for both the care
and rights responses. Foster demonstrates that females begin the adaptation
process in law school. Foster, supra note 3, at 288. Both studies, Foster's and
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In the novel One L, Scott Turow described a female col-
league, Gina, as "feisty, outspoken, and glitteringly bright," and
quoted her frustration: "They're turning me into someone else
... [i]t's someone I don't want to be. '10 3 Marina Angel, in her
candid account of participating in the first wave of female law
students at Columbia Law School, explained the basis for her
decision to drop out.1 0 4 She recounted that she was "[n]ot drop-
ping out of law, but dropping out of law school in order to
regain my perspective, and to see if I could fit my values and
goals into a system that seemed to be in conflict with them.'10 5
As these studies and anecdotes show, women, as interlop-
ers in a male-dominated profession, either accept the structure
and adapt, thereby risking eternal silence or schizophrenia, or
reject the structure and disconnect, risking isolation and
uncertainty.
II. THE STUDY: QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
A. STUDY OBJECTIVES
The study was designed to achieve four distinct objectives.
The first was to contribute to the theoretical understanding of
moral development. The second objective was to explore with
an adult population Gilligan's assumptions about moral per-
spective. The third was to evaluate the effects of bias in favor
of rights-oriented analysis in legal training. The final objective
was to enable scholars to understand better the legal profession
and the system that society has developed to resolve its ethical
and moral conflicts.
In particular, the study was designed to investigate the use
of care and rights orientation by law students, to determine
whether either orientation is aligned with gender, to determine
whether students' orientations change after one year of law
school, and finally, to determine whether the changes in orien-
tation after the first year of law school correlate with gender.
The following questions guided the study's focus:
(1) Is there a significant difference in the care orientation
of women and men at the beginning of their first year of law
school?
Jack and Jack's, demonstrate that this adaptation is not without cost. Id at
288-90; JACK & JACK, supra note 63, at 137-49.
103. TuRow, supra note 3, at 90.
104. Angel, supra note 3, at 815-16.
105. Id
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(2) Is there a significant difference in the rights orientation
of women and men at the beginning of their first year of law
school?
(3) Is there a significant change in the care orientation of
students from the beginning to the end of the first year of law
school?
(4) Is there a significant change in the rights orientation of
students from the beginning to the end of the first year of law
school?
(5) Is there a significant difference between the care orien-
tation of women and men at the end of their first year of law
school?
(6) Is there a significant difference between the rights ori-
entation of women and men at the end of their first year of law
school?
The study examined law students at the beginning and the
end of their first year of law school. The following subsections
describe the study's population, sample, sources of data collec-
tion, and sampling procedures; the administration of the data
sources; the methods of interpreting and scoring the data; and
the means of data analysis.
B. POPULATION
The study's population was the 417-member class of 1992 at
Temple University School of Law. Of the first-year students,
46.8% were female and 53.2% were male.1 0 6 Temple University
is a publicly funded, urban university. Its population is diverse
in economic status, life-stage, and career background. Temple
Law School's population reflects the diversity found in the Uni-
versity's student body.
C. SAMPLE
The subjects for the Washington University Sentence Com-
pletion Test consisted of a random sample of 200 students se-
lected from the first-year class.'0 7 The subjects for the Real-
106. Data on file with the Temple University School of Law Office of Aca-
demic Affairs, Development, & Planning. Temple's ratio of women to men
was higher than the national figure; of the 43,825 students that entered law
school across the nation in 1989, 18,722, or 42.7%, were women, and 25,103, or
57.3%, were men. REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 66.
107. Gender and class section were held constant so that the sentence com-
pletion test sample consisted of 20 women and 20 men randomly selected from
each of the five teaching sections into which the first-year class was divided.
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Life Moral Conflict and Choice interviews were fifteen women
and fifteen men, also randomly selected from the first-year
class.
1 0 8
1. Sentence Completion Test Sample
There was no significant difference between the Sentence
Completion Test sample and Temple Law School's population
in gender and ethnic composition. 10 9 The subjects' gender was
controlled; fifty percent were female and fifty percent were
male. Their ethnicity, however, was not.110
In addition to asking the subjects of the Sentence Comple-
tion Test and the Interview about their gender and ethnicity,
this researcher also asked about the subjects' age, marital sta-
tus, and number of children. The 200 subjects for the Sentence
Completion Test appeared highly representative of the Temple
Law School population. The majority of students were entering
professional school within a few years of their undergraduate
Class section was held constant in order to eliminate the potentially con-
founding influence of the fact that each section had different professors.
There were four sections of day students and one section in the evening
school. The sections were fairly evenly distributed according to gender. Stu-
dents were assigned to class section arbitrarily; therefore, section by section
examination of the research variables is irrelevant in terms of student
distribution.
108. These students were randomly selected from the population; three
women and three men were selected from each of the five sections.
109. Whether the difference in population and sample is significant is de-
termined by a chi-square statistic. Chi-square is a statistical test that examines
the hypothesized difference between independent samples that use qualitative
data coded as frequencies. The test is based on differences between observed
frequencies and expected frequencies.
110.
Table 1
Gender and Ethnic Composition of the Population (First-Year
Class) and of the Sentence Completion Test Sample
POPULATION SAMPLE
TOTAL N = 417 TrTAL N = 200
% (N) % (N)
Gender
Female 46.8 (195) 50.0 (100)
Male 53.2 (222) 50.0 (100)
Ethnicity
Asian 3.4 (14) 2.5 (5)
Black 7.9 (33) 7.5 (15)
Hispanic 3.4 (14) 3.5 (7)
Caucasian 85.4 (356) 86.0 (172)
Other (unavailable) .5 (1)
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degree."- Groups that used to be minimally represented in law
school populations, such as ethnic minorities, women returning
to the workplace, and adults seeking a second career, have in-
creased in size." 2
2. Interview Sample
There was also no significant difference between the Inter-
view sample and the general law school population in either
gender or ethnic composition. The students' gender was con-
trolled in this sample as well; fifty percent were female and
fifty percent were male. The students were otherwise ran-
domly selected." 3
D. SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION
The study used three sources of data collection: the Wash-
ington University Sentence Completion Test, 1 4 the Real-Life
111. For both the sample and the population, the mean age was 27, with a
range from 21 to 67; the median was 24; and the mode was 22.
112. Forty-five of the 200 students were married; of these, 23 were women
and 22 were men. Six students had three children, 16 students had two, 12 stu-
dents had one, and 166 students had no children. Of the 34 students with chil-
dren, 22 were women and 12 were men. Forty-one students, or 20%, had a
degree beyond a bachelor's; 18 had masters degrees in arts, science, or educa-
tion; eight had M.B.A.s; four had Ph.D.s; and three had M.D.s. Of the 41 stu-
dents with degrees beyond a bachelor's, 19 were women and 22 were men.
113.
Table 2
Gender and Ethnic Composition of the Population (First
Year-Class) and of the Interview Sample
POPULATION SAMPLE
TOTAL N = 417 TOTAL N = 30
%(N) % (N)
Gender
Female 46.8 (195) 50.0(15)
Male 53.2 (222) 50.0(15)
Ethnicity
Asian 3.4 (14) 3 (1)
Black 7.9 (33) 10 (3)
Hispanic 3.4 (14) 0 (0)
Caucasian 85.4 (356) 86.6 (26)
The mean age of the interview sample was 26. The youngest student inter-
viewed was 21, the oldest was 40. Six interviewees were married, three women
and three men, and two had children, one woman and one man.
114. See JANE LOEVINGER & RUTH WESSLER, MEASURING EGO DEVELOP-
MENT I: CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF A SENTENCE COMPLETION TEST 139-46
(1970); infra text accompanying notes 124-28 (discussing the scoring procedure
for care and rights orientations of the sentence completion test).
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Moral Conflict and Choice Interview,'1 5 and a demographic in-
formation questionnaire.
1. The Washington University Sentence Completion Test
The study used nineteen sentence stems selected from the
Washington University Sentence Completion Test. The Sen-
tence Completion Test is a projective test; individuals respond
freely to each of the sentence stems with their own association
to the content presented. Examples of such stems include:
"When a child will not join in group activities... ," and "My
conscience bothers me if .... " The Sentence Completion Test
is both reliable and consistent, and has been used exten-
sively.11 6 As a measure of ego development, its construct valid-
ity is substantial.1 1 7
The responses to the sentence stems were scored for rights
and care thinking pursuant to a method developed by Annie
Rogers. 11 8 Rogers's study, in which she developed two scoring
manuals, one for rating care thinking and one for rating rights
thinking on twenty of the thirty-six Washington University
sentence stems, established good construct validity and
reliability.1 1 9
2. The Research Interview
The study employed an interview method central to Gilli-
gan's research methods. The interview scheme, developed and
empirically validated by Lyons,120 is the Real-Life Moral Con-
flict and Choice Interview, and its scientific validity is sup-
115. See GUIDE, supra note 59.
116. See Carolyn Redmore & Ken Waldman, Reliability of a Sentence Com-
pletion Measure Ego Development, 39 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 236, 243
(1975).
117. JANE LOEVINGER, SCIENTIFIC WAYS IN THE STUDY OF EGO DEVELOP-
MENT 1-24 (1979).
118. Annie G. Rogers, Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning. A Validity
Study of Two Moral Orientations (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Washington University, St. Louis).
119. Rogers's study found significant hetero-trait, hetero-method correla-
tions, meeting Campbell and Fiske's specifications for convergent and discrimi-
nant validity. This is a measure of construct validity, indicating that this
content-rating system has good validity as a system for scoring care and rights
thinking. Intercoder reliability, as determined by the kappa statistic, was .74
for the care coders and .70 for the rights coders. Agreement was 88% for the
care coders and 87% for the rights coders. To ensure reliability in this study,
the researcher and another coder interpreted the responses to the sentence
stems independently.
120. See Lyons, supra note 53.
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ported by ongoing research.' 2 ' The Interview consists of two
sections: general moral orientation and real-life dilemma. To
ensure reliability, the researcher and another coder indepen-
dently interpreted the interviews.
The interview consisted of several standard questions. The
interviewer asked interviewees to describe themselves and en-
couraged them to define a moral conflict and discuss, in their
own terms, the actions they took and the decisions they made
in the moral conflict. The interviewer explored the students'
use of moral language to understand how they interpreted and
resolved the conflict.
In each interview, the interviewer made the same introduc-
tory remarks and asked the same questions.122 The interviewer
read the following to the student:
I want to know your own thoughts and feelings-not what you think I
or the legal system would expect you to say. Please do not discuss the
specifics of the interview with anyone.
Section I: General moral orientation
1. How would you describe yourself to yourself?
2. Does this describe you in a way that you know it's really you?
3. Has your decision to come to law school changed the way you
think about yourself?
4. How? In what way?
Section II: Real-life dilemma
1. Have you ever been in a situation of moral conflict where you
had to make a decision but weren't sure what was the right thing to
do?
2. Could you describe the situation?
3. What were the conflicts for you in the situation?
4. Why was it a conflict?
5. What did you do?
6. Do you think it was the right thing to do?
7. How do you know?
E. SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND DATA ANALYSIS
The sampling procedure for both the Sentence Completion
Test and the Interview followed standard research practice.12S
121. E.g., GUIDE, supra note 59.
122. Interviewees also were asked to respond to a legal hypothetical, but
these responses were not data for this study.
123. The sampling procedure for the Sentence Completion Test was as fol-
lows: Immediately preceding their first formal class session, the entire incom-
ing class was given a written instrument packet. This packet contained a
consent letter, a demographic information sheet, and the sentence completion
test. In the 32d week of their first year, the entire class was given the written
instrument packet again. The identification numbers of the completed written
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The data was analyzed in a two-step process. This re-
searcher first reduced the data, interpreting the content and
representing it empirically, for both the Sentence Completions
and the Interview. The second step was to statistically analyze
the data.
instruments were matched. From this population, a stratified random sam-
pling of 200 responses, 20 men and 20 women from each of the five sections,
was selected to be scored and analyzed.
The sampling procedure for the interviews was as follows: Thirty ran-
domly selected students, three women and three men from each of the five
sections, were interviewed during their first week of classes. Of the 397 com-
pleted consent forms, 30 were chosen at random, holding the section and gen-
der constant. The researcher telephoned each potential interviewee and
requested a half-hour interview. The researcher did not inform the potential
interviewee of the research variables being investigated, even when asked.
The researcher did inform the potential interviewee that the interview could
be stopped at any point if there was any discomfort with the questions asked.
Only two potential interviewees did not consent to be interviewed and two al-
ternates were randomly chosen from the population, now reduced to the gen-
der and section of the person refusing. The students were informed that they
would be interviewed again near the end of the first year of school. During
the 32d week of class, the students were contacted again. All were available
and met with the researcher or the trained research assistant.
The sentence completion test was administered as follows: All incoming
students were in five lecture rooms and simultaneously received the written
instrument packet containing a consent letter, a demographic questionnaire,
and the sentence completion test. In each room this statement was read: "Re-
search is being conducted on the incoming class at Temple Law School during
the year 1989-90. I will be handing out a packet of information for you to com-
plete. Additional data will be collected near the end of your first year of
school. The researcher thanks you for your participation." No further infor-
mation was given. Upon completion, the written instrument packets were col-
lected. The consent letter informed participants that Temple University
School of Law had agreed to take part in a research project examining the im-
pact of the first year of legal training on law students. It made clear that data
would be collected again in the spring of 1990. The last four digits of each stu-
dent's Social Security number, which is non-identifiable information, would be
the means of matching responses. Confidentiality was assured. The letter also
indicated that participants would be chosen at random and contacted to be in-
terviewed, and that participation was not mandatory. During the 32d week of
school, the sentence completion test was readministered to the first-year class.
At the readministration, the class was told: "This represents the completion of
the written data collection for the research conducted on this year's incoming
class. Your time and attention has been very much appreciated. Upon comple-
tion, results of the study will be made available to anyone who so wishes." No
further information was given.
The students were interviewed in half-hour time slots during the first and
second week of classes, and again during the 33d and 34th week. Each inter-
view was taped and transcribed in order to code and score it.
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1. Data Reduction of the Sentence Completion Test
The coders used a scoring system advanced by Rogers to
measure rights and care orientations in students' responses to
selected sentence stems.124 Rogers's scoring system builds on
recent breakthroughs in gender difference research.125 Some
methods of coding responses to evaluate the rights and the care
perspective regard the two as mutually exclusive or dichoto-
mous categories.126 Rogers's scoring system, however, assumes
that the orientations are independent. Each perspective is a
way to frame and solve moral problems. Individuals have a
tendency to focus on one orientation and ninimi e the other.
Because the Sentence Completion Test is a projective test,
concepts such as should, ought, right, wrong, and care, or rules
and notions such as love, connectedness, independence, and
role-relatedness can be inferred from the stems and expressed
in the responses to the stems. The scoring system identifies, for
each stem, rights-oriented and care-oriented projections by in-
terpreting how a response reflects a view of relationships and
moral concerns from each perspective. Stems are scored either
"C" for care-oriented responses; "R" for rights-oriented re-
sponses; "CIR" for both care and rights; and "U" for unscorable
responses that reflect neither care nor rights, and for non-re-
sponses. The coders did not consider the students' gender, age,
or race. The study calculated intercoder reliability as a percent
agreement. 2 7
Consider the following sample stem and responses from
the study: "My conscience bothers me if. . ."; a care-oriented
student responded ".... I don't control my temper and I end up
hurting someone close to me." In contrast, a rights-oriented
student completed the sentence with ". . I do something I
know is not right or if I have allowed something that goes
against my values to take place without my intervening." A
student who used both the rights and care perspectives re-
sponded ". . . I lie or am disrespectful to someone that I care
about." Finally, a response that revealed no moral concerns at
124. Rogers, supra note 118.
125. Rogers's scoring system builds on work by Johnston, supra note 55,
and Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 51.
126. Lyons, supra note 53, at 22-23; S. Walker et al., Moral Stages and
Moral Orientations in Real-Life and Hypothetical Dilemmas, 58 CHILD DEVEL.
842, 845 (1987).
127. For the purposes of intercoder reliability, two coders were used. The
level of intercoder reliability was very high; there was an agreement of 95.4%
across 30 randomly selected samples.
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all was ". . . if I spend too much money.' 128
2. Data Reduction of the Research Interview
This researcher interpreted the interviews according to the
most recent method of reading interview text for moral orien-
tation.129 The interview was read four times by coders who
were blind to the gender, age, and race of the participant. Dur-
ing the first reading, the focus was on the story line. The goal
was to understand the narrator's tale-the story as it was told.
During the second reading, the focus was on the narrator's
voice, in particular, on instances in which the interviewees used
the word "I" in relation to their moral concerns.
During the third reading, the reader listened for the logic
of care thinking and identified key sentences which repre-
sented care orientation. The reader thus listened for instances
in which the interviewee articulated concepts such as shared
responsibility, knowing another well, and attending and re-
sponding to need.
The fourth time, the reader looked for examples of rights
thinking and identified key sentences which represented the
presence of rights-oriented analysis. The reader thus focused
on concepts such as reciprocity, putting oneself in another's
place, justified punishment, and earned reward. Like the Sen-
tence Completion Test scoring process, this interpretive system
assumes that the orientations are independent categories.
This researcher and a second coder then scored the inter-
views according to the degree of rights and care thinking pres-
ent in the moral reasoning process.130
128. See infra part III.A.1.a (describing the care logic upon which the anal-
ysis is based); infra part III.A.2.a (describing the rights logic upon which the
analysis is based).
129. GUIDE, supra note 59.
130. The scoring procedure was developed by Gilligan and Attanucci in
their study of 80 adolescents and young adults. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra
note 51, at 79. Under this procedure, a real-life moral dilemma consisting of
only care or rights considerations is labeled care only or rights only, while a
dilemma consisting of 75% or more care or rights considerations is labeled care
focus or rights focus, respectively. Id A dilemma in which both considera-
tions are present but neither orientation accounts for 75% of the codable con-
siderations is placed in the care-rights category. Id Thus, dilemmas are
described as focused only when more than 75% of the considerations fall into
one mode. Id
Intercoder reliability for the two independent coders was calculated as a
percent agreement. The second coder scored a random sample of ten inter-
views for the purposes of intercoder reliability. Both coders were blind to gen-
der, age, and race of participants. The two codings achieved a high level of
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3. Statistical Analysis
The research questions dictated procedures for analyzing
data.1 31 The study used descriptive statistics for analyzing dem-
ographic data.
III. FINDINGS
The study analyzed the relationships that exist among
three variables: gender, moral orientation, and the first year of
legal education. This Part describes the study's findings as they
relate to each of the six questions, then explains the findings'
implications for legal education.
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS
1. Question One
Is there a significant difference in the care orientation of women and
men at the beginning of theirfirst year of law school?
reliability. The range of agreement across the ten randomly selected inter-
views was 80 to 95%, while the mean agreement was 89.5%.
131. The study statistically analyzed the responses to the six questions in
each of the following ways (for the text of the questions, see supra part II.A.):
To answer question one (about the care orientations of women and men enter-
ing law school) using sentence completion test data, a two-tailed t test was
used. (A t test is used to determine whether the sample mean qualifies as a
probable or an improbable outcome. Each statistical test-the t test, ANOVA,
and chi-square-is used to determine the degree to which these results are
meaningful. In doing so, the tests determine the probability that the outcome
could be a chance occurrence.). To answer this question using interview data,
a chi-square test was used. See supra note 109 (describing chi-square test).
To answer question two (about the rights orientations of men and women
entering law school) using sentence completion test data, a two-tailed t test
was used. To answer this question using interview data, a chi-square test was
used.
To answer question three (about whether the students' care orientations
changed during the first year of law school) using sentence completion test
data, a 2 x 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used. (ANOVA is a sta-
tistical method for making simultaneous comparisons between two or more
means.).
To answer question four (about whether the students' rights orientations
changed during the first year of law school) using sentence completion test
data, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was used.
To answer question five (about whether the first year of law school has a
significant effect on the care orientation of women and men) using sentence
completion test data, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was used. To answer this question
using interview data, a chi-square test was used.
To answer question six (about whether the first year of law school has a
significant effect on the rights orientation of women and men) using sentence
completion test data, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was used. To answer this question
using interview data, a chi-square test was used.
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The study answered this question affirmatively. The Sen-
tence Completion Test data132 showed a significant difference
in care orientation between women and men entering law
school.133 Similarly, the Interview data showed a significant as-
sociation between gender and moral orientation. Both tests in-
dicated that, upon entering law school, women were more
likely to respond to moral dilemmas with a care perspective. 134
a. Sentence Completion Test Data Interpreted for Care
At the beginning of the school year, significantly more wo-
men than men used care logic in their sentence stem comple-
tions. In response to stems about people who are alone or in
trouble, care-oriented thinkers wrote about helping, protecting,
or understanding needs.l13 In response to stems that referred
to family or friends, care-oriented responses reflected the satis-
faction that these relationships bring, as well as the love and
132. Care scores and rights scores for all sentence completion test analyses
were percentage scores, not raw scores. The percentage care score was the ra-
tio of raw care score to total scorable responses. The percentage rights score
was the ratio of raw rights score to total scorable responses. The study used
percentage scores due to the confounding nature of the unscorable responses.
Unscorable responses are those that were neither rights nor care responses, as
well as those that were left unanswered. On the first application of the sen-
tence completion test, 36% of the overall responses were unscorable. On the
second application, 45% were unscorable.
133. The study computed the means and standard deviations of responses
to the 19 sentence stems. The mean care score for women was 57; for men, it
was 40. A two-tailed t test was used to examine differences between men and
women in care orientation. The result showed a significant effect for gender (t(1, 198) = 8.18, p < .0001). This indicated that in the sample of students en-
tering law school, women tended toward a moral orientation of care more than
men did.
134. The significance of this finding was the relationship between moral
orientation and gender. Both women and men presented dilemmas in the
care-rights category, but the care focus was more likely to occur in the real-life
moral dilemmas of women at the beginning of the first year of law school, and
the rights focus more likely to occur in the real-life moral dilemmas of men at
the beginning of law school. The test for statistical significance with the inter-
view data at the beginning of the year yielded a chi-square (2, N = 30) = 9.90,
p < .01.
135. Representative sentence stems about people alone or in trouble fol-
lowed by representative care responses of students in this study include:
"When a child will not join in group activities. .
"He should be encouraged to do so."
'T would support the child and then ease him into the group."
"When people are helpless...
"I try to help."
'T try to show them I care."
"They need support to become self-sufficient and self reliant."
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patience that they require.13 In response to stems about self,
care-oriented responders described qualities that support rela-
tionships, taking care of oneself, taking care of others, and tak-
ing pride in the ability to form or enhance relationships. 37 In
response to stems about moral dilemmas, care thinkers' ob-
jected to behavior that interfered with relationships. 13s
The Sentence Completion Test revealed a significant gen-
der difference in care orientation and indicated that connected-
ness and responsibility to others were predominant themes in
women's personal perspectives before they entered law school.
The research indicated that this perspective was present in
men's thinking as well, but was significantly less important to
men's moral decision making than to women's.
b. Interview Data Interpreted for Care
The Real-Life Moral Conflict and Choice Interview pro-
vided another opportunity to evaluate the students' perception
of moral problem solving. At the beginning of the first year of
law school, fourteen of the fifteen women interviewed and five
of the fifteen men interviewed used care logic as they described
the conflict they experienced and the choice they made. Ac-
136. Representative sentence stems about family and friends followed by
representative care responses of students in this study include:
"Raising a family...":
"Is one of the joys of life."
"Takes planning, patience, and great understanding."
"Though difficult is very rewarding."
"Being with other people...
"Is what life is all about"
"That I like and am comfortable with is one of the best ways to spend my
time."
137. Representative sentence stems about self followed by representative
care responses of students in this study include:
" e thing I like about myself is .. ":
"My ability to get along with other people."
"My ability to reach out and help others."
"I am...":
"A caring person."
"A good listener."
138. Representative sentence stems about moral dilemmas followed by rep-
resentative care responses of students in this study include:
"What gets me into trouble is...":
"Putting my foot in my mouth by telling people what I really feeL"
"My impatience with others' lack of concern."
"When I act selfishly."
"My conscience bothers me if...
"I hurt someone's feelings."
'My behavior is offensive."
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cording to The Guide to Reading Narratives of Conflict and
Choice for Sef and Moral Voice, "A person framing a moral di-
lemma from the care orientation tends to focus on the specifics
of the situation and attend to the particular needs of others in-
volved in the conflict." 139 The students experienced conflicts
when they had to choose between a principle in which they be-
lieved and another individual's welfare.
The following excerpts from women's interviews at the be-
ginning of the school year illustrate the care construction, as
reflected by a conflict between a principle or a duty and con-
cern for another's well-being in a discussion about cheating.
I felt I ought to tell (the person) something, but I didn't want to
affect the friendship.
I know that I'm not being fair but I don't want to hurt him.
I had to hurt some people but it was for my own survival.
I had to decide between "Do I do what's right?" or "Do I protect
myself and the people around me?"
The following excerpts from men's interviews at the begin-
ning of law school illustrate the care perspective:
I guess the teacher was placing an obligation on us but I didn't
want to lose the person as a friend.
I knew I was going to hurt a friend but what he did was really
wrong.
I chose not to tell because I felt at the time it would have hurt
him too much.
These interviewees were concerned about harming some-
one else, a relationship, or themselves. The principles that each
student had been taught to follow no longer provided them
with the "right" answer. Therefore, they needed to reassess
the rule. One student, for example, articulated her concern
that each of the two options available, cheating and helping a
friend, or not cheating and not helping a friend, was
disagreeable:
I ended up not giving her my work, but explaining how I went about
it .... It would have been more "right" to say, "Go do it yourself,"
but I had another interest; I didn't want to jeopardize the friendship.
I'd say it wasn't exactly right, but it wasn't exactly wrong.
This student knew that the "right" decision, vindicating
the principle that cheating was wrong, would not resolve the
problem. Yet she still did not want to hurt a friend.140 Her
139. GuIDE, supra note 59, at 95.
140. This student's response comports with Gilligan's definition of moral
maturity as seeing in at least two ways and speaking in at least two languages.
See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 173-74.
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struggle shows how she acknowledged both principled and
care-oriented concerns. She ended up neither giving her friend
the paper nor denying the relationship; thus her final decision
was a third alternative, her own resolution to the tension be-
tween fairness and care.
Lyons points out that a care thinker evaluates a moral
choice in terms of whether a relationship is maintained.141 The
care-oriented students expressed this perspective when asked,
"How did you know it was the right thing to do?" Some of the
responses included:
Because otherwise it would have made matters Ea situation in-
volving subject, mother, and sister] worse and they would have ended
up not talking.
Because nobody ended up hurt.
Because you have to expend your energy building relationships,
not destroying them.
The responses to Question One are significant because they
show that both female and male adults have access to the dis-
tinctive logic of a care orientation, a result consistent with Gilfi-
gan's hypothesis. These results also show that women are
significantly more likely to interpret their experience and
make moral choices from a care-oriented perspective. In addi-
tion, these findings underline the necessity of using male and
female samples when developing theories about men and wo-
men. Single gender samples furnish incomplete data.
Furthermore, the answer to Question One reveals yet an-
other reason that Kohlberg's model, in which care reasoning is
a substage in the sequence of moral development,' 42 is inade-
quate. In 1969, Kohlberg and Kramer stated that relational
thinking may be functional for housewives and mothers, but
not for "businessmen and professionals."'' 43 All of the female
students in this study were college-educated adults about to
enter a professional school. Because relational thinking is only
midway in Kohlberg's linear progression to mature moral rea-
soning, the presence of a care perspective in this sample lends
additional weight to the claim of gender bias in Kohlberg's
model. At the same time, this finding supports Gilligan's posi-
141. Nona P. Lyons, Listening to Voices We Have Not Heard- Emma Wil-
lard Girls' Ideas about Sef, Relationships, and Morality, in CAROL GILLIGAN
ET AL., MAIG CONNEcTIoNs: THE RELATIONAL WoRLDS OF ADOLESCENT
GIS AT EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL 30, 31-32 (1989).
142. KOHLBERG, supra note 20.
143. Kohlberg & Kramer, supra note 26, at 108.
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tion that mature reasoning is the ability to interpret from both
perspectives.
This finding suggests a new and fertile area of research.
No other studies have examined the population of women en-
tering law school and explored gender differences in perspec-
tive and experience. This absence was not surprising before
1980 because law school populations were predominantly male.
In this decade, however, inquiry into the experience of women
in law school continues to be minimal.
The study's answer to Question One reveals that women
who chose to come to Temple University School of Law in 1989
reasoned predominantly from a perspective concerned with
connectedness, preventing harm, maintaining relationships, and
responding to need. The research also suggests that women en-
tering law school are much more likely to employ a relational
moral decision-making model than men. As these are prelimi-
nary findings in this area of research, further investigation is
warranted.
2. Question Two
Is there a signifcant difference in the rights orientation of women
and men at the beginning of their first year of law school?
The study also answered this question affirmatively. The
analysis of the Sentence Completion Test data demonstrated a
significant difference in rights orientation between women and
men entering law school.'" The Interview data also revealed a
significant association between gender and rights-based moral
orientation. Before their first year of law school, the male stu-
dents were more likely than the female students to associate
moral conflicts with rights.' 45
a. Sentence Completion Test Data Interpreted for Rights
At the beginning of the school year, significantly more men
than women used rights logic in their sentence stem comple-
tions. In response to stems about people alone or in trouble,
rights-oriented thinkers were more likely to look for reasons to
144. Means and standard deviations of responses to the 19 sentence stems
were computed. The women's mean rights score was 44.38; the men's was
61.88. A two-tailed t test was used to examine the differences between women
and men in rights orientation. The result showed a significant effect for gen-
der (t (1, 198) = -8.44, p < .0001). This indicated that in the sample of stu-
dents entering law school, men tended toward a moral orientation of rights
more than did women.
145. See supra note 134.
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explain the situation, emphasize that people should help them-
selves or seek help, cite a duty or obligation to help, and assert
that people have a right to be alone or may even prefer being
alone.146 In response to stems that referred to family or
friends, rights-oriented responses reflected concern with role
relationships and a duty or obligation to others.147 In response
to stems about self, rights responders noted the values of indi-
viduality and independence, fairness and objectivity, accom-
plishments, ambitions, principles, personal beliefs, and freedom
from the influence of others.148 In response to stems about
moral dilemmas, rights thinkers objected to people who broke
rules or standards and criticized behavior that interfered with
personal achievement.149
The Sentence Completion Test measured a significant gen-
der difference in rights orientation and indicated that separate-
ness, objectivity, and fairness were predominant in men's
146. Representative sentence stems about people alone or in trouble fol-
lowed by representative rights responses of students in this study include:
"When a child will not join in group activities...":
"There is usually an underlying cause and I try to find out the reasons
why."
"It is the child's choice, he doesn't need to participate if he doesn't want
to."P
'"When people are helpless. .
"Society must step in and assist in rectifying some of their problems."
"There should be resources to help them help themselves."
147. Representative sentence stems about family and friends followed by
representative rights responses of students in this study include:
"Raising a family...":
"Is one of the most important contributions that we can make to society."
"Is my greatest accomplishment."
'Being with other people...":
"Is the way I learn more about myself"
"Is fundamental to the development of one's character."
148. Representative sentence stems about self followed by representative
rights responses of students in this study include:
"The thing I like about myself...":
"I am a hard worker and an independent thinker."
"My intelligence and drive for success."
"I am...":
"Striving to reach my potential as a human being."
"A young woman with determination, high aspirations, and good values."
149. Representative sentence stems about moral dilemmas followed by rep-
resentative rights responses of students in this study include:
What gets me in trouble is...":
"My tenacity to pursue what I believe is correct"
"When I ignore my responsibilities."
"My conscience bothers me if...":
"I don't work up to my capabilities."
'I lie or go against my values."
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
personal perspectives before entering law school. These quali-
ties were present in women's thinking as well but were signifi-
cantly less important to women than to men.
b. Interview Data Interpreted for Rights
The Real-Life Moral Conflict and Choice Interview pro-
vided additional data on gender difference in problem construc-
tion and resolution. At the beginning of the first year of law
school, ten of the fifteen men interviewed, but only one of the
fifteen women interviewed, perceived moral conflict as an issue
involving rights or justice considerations. This demonstrates
that men who chose to come to Temple University School of
Law in 1989 viewed themselves and their relationships with
others predominantly from a rights perspective. That is, the
men tended to resolve conflicts by appealing to equity and fair-
ness, by respecting autonomy, and by assuming that each indi-
vidual possesses preordained rights.
Kohlberg's model provides a traditional description of that
perspective:
Justice is not a rule or a set of rules; it is a moral principle. By a
moral principle we mean a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule
of choosing which we want all people to adopt always in all situations
.... A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims,
you versus me, you versus a third person. There is only one princi-
pled basis for resolving claims: justice or equality. Treat every man's
claim impartially regardless of the man.150
Students who approached moral decisions from a rights ori-
entation resolved moral conflicts by weighing competing claims
and assessing the comparative weight of the negative and posi-
tive consequences. A person framing a moral dilemma from
the rights orientation tends to adopt an impartial standpoint.1 1
The following excerpts from men's interviews at the begin-
ning of the school year illustrate the rights-oriented construc-
tion of competing claims:
The question was whether to steal from a store. I wanted [the
item] but I just thought I was never one to steal and I figured "Why
should I start now?"
I felt a moral obligation to return it balanced against wanting to
have it in my pocket.
150. Lawrence Kohlberg, Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of
the Platonic View, in MORAL EDUCATION 57, 69-70 (Nancy Sizer & Theodore
R. Sizer eds., 1970).
151. Lawrence Blum, Particularity and Responsiveness, in THE EMER-
GENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN 306, 321 (Jerome Kagan & Sharon
Lamb eds., 1987).
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I internalized this as a test. You end up daring people to tease
you about a decision you make. In that way you also prove to yourself
your ability to stand up to other people and do what's right.
I don't like lying to friends because I wouldn't want them to lie to
me.
An excerpt from one woman's interview at the beginning
of the school year also illustrates the rights construction:
I had to decide whether to lie to my family and nt be honest to
myself or to be honest with myself and tell my family .... Honesty
was a moral rule that I had been raised with and I believed was more
significant.
Consistent with Lyons's research, these students showed a
tendency to evaluate their decisions on the basis of whether
they upheld their values, standards, or principles. 52 For exam-
ple, the following statements were responses to the question
"How did you know it was the right thing to do?":
It went against my own personal values.
It wouldn't have been proper to do anything else.
It was my obligation.
I wasn't entitled to it in the first place.
The data that this research generated in response to Ques-
tion Two supports Gilligan's view that men are more likely to
reason from a rights perspective. The finding that men are sig-
nificantly more rights-oriented than women is similar to the
findings of other important research. 5 3 Traditional moral de-
velopment theory found rights reasoning to be the predominant
perspective among the morally mature because traditional the-
orists used male subjects only. The study corroborates Gilli-
gan's claim that a rights-oriented theory of moral development
does not fully represent human experience because it does not
reflect women's experience.
The significance of these findings is that they corroborate
the general assumption that the thought processes that law
school demands of students and that the general public expects
of lawyers-a rights orientation-is aligned with the men who
enter law school but not with the women. Epstein, in her socio-
logical study of female lawyers, recognized that because white,
middle-aged men were the demographic norm for so long in the
profession, male gender characteristics shaped the lawyer mold
and determined the substance of good lawyering154 As this
152. Lyons, supra note 53, at 37-41.
153. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 51, at 79-81; Johnston, supra note 55,
at 58-66; Lyons, supra note 141, at 64-69.
154. CYNTiA F. EPSTEiN, WOMEN IN LAw 265-301 (1981).
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finding shows, men who choose to go to law school reason from
a perspective congruent with the assumed qualifications for the
job. This research also shows that women choosing to go to law
school are significantly less likely to exhibit the characteristics
necessary for traditional lawyering.
The data collected from students before they began law
school demonstrates that men and women emphasize qualities
and values that reflect two different approaches to moral rea-
soning. Only recently have people, in evaluating the legal sys-
tem, begun to think about qualities and values that are not
associated with the male norm.1 55
3. Question Three
Is there a signiftcant change in the care orientation of students from
the beginning to the end of the first year of law school?
The study also answered this question affirmatively156
The Sentence Completion Test data showed a significant
change over time. Students exhibited greater care orientation
at the beginning of the first year of law school than at the end
of the first year.15 7
The study assumed that care and rights thinking are not
mutually exclusive perspectives. Studies conducted by John-
ston15 8 and Gilligan and Attanucci159 showed that people use
both moral perspectives but usually employ one perspective
more than the other. In both studies, the researchers were con-
cerned that context influenced the likelihood that subjects gave
155. For the most comprehensive study to date that examines the relation-
ship between moral orientation and lawyers' role-responsibilities, see JACK &
JACK, supra note 63, at 95-129. Jack and Jack found four different ways fe-
male and male lawyers respond to the role demand of nonjudgmental loyalty.
Id They range from maximum role identification, where professional and
personal morality coincide, to minimal role identification where professional
and personal morality are in great conflict and cannot coexist. Id.; see also
Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLrrlcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRi-
TiQUE 453 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (discussing feminist strategies for
attacking legal theory).
156. For a discussion of the implications of this finding for legal education,
see infra part III.B.
157. An analysis of variance showed that a main effect for time emerged
such that greater care orientation existed at the beginning of the first year of
law school, as measured by the sentence completion test (mean = 48.44), than
at the end of the first year, as measured by the same test (mean = 43.64) (F (1,
198) = 13.25, p < .0001). This indicated that one year of law school education
decreased care-oriented responses in the entire sample of students.
158. Johnston, supra note 55, at 60-66.
159. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 51, at 82-85.
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care or rights responses. 60 Gilligan and Attanucci's research
included a study of first-year medical students, a large number
of whom could not or would not describe a moral dilemma.'
61
This led the researchers to wonder whether the students'
resistance to admitting uncertainty was influenced by what
they perceived to be the medical community's values.
162
Whether context influences students' moral decision mak-
ing was one of this study's central concerns. The findings in re-
sponse to Question Three that indicate that law students
submerge a care orientation to align with the rights assump-
tions of law school support the notion that context bias is pres-
ent. These findings suggest that further investigation into
contexts which tend to silence a spontaneous voice of care
would be useful.
The answers to Question Three confirm the findings of a
study on legal education which concluded that law school does
not incorporate the relational side of human nature. Thomas
Shaffer and Robert Redmount's 1977 study on humanism in
law school reported that almost all of the respondents were
"problem-oriented" rather than "person-oriented" in their per-
ception of case-study clients.' 63 Shaffer and Redmount con-
cluded that law school "avoids the opportunity to teach
students what to do about their humane feelings."'
' 6
4. Question Four
Is there a significant change in the rights orientation of students
from the beginning to the end of the first year of law school?
The study answered Question Four affirmatively. The Sen-
tence Completion Test data showed that among all students a
rights orientation was significantly less pronounced at the be-
ginning of the first year of law school than at the end.
65
160. Id. at 83; Johnston, supra note 55, at 60-61.
161. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 51, at 83.
162. Id.
163. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STU-
DENTS, AND PEOPLE 115 (1977).
164. I- at 138-39.
165. An analysis of variance showed that a main effect for time emerged
such that the measure of rights orientation was less at the beginning of the
first year of law school, according to the sentence completion test (mean =
53.13), than it was at the end of the first year of law school, as measured by
the same test (mean = 58.11) (F (1, 198) = 14.37, p < .0001). The fourth re-
search question was answered affirmatively. This indicated one year of law
school education increased rights-oriented responses in the entire sample of
students.
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This finding is congruent with two comprehensive studies
about law school teaching. The first study, a comprehensive
survey of eight law schools, found virtual unanimity among stu-
dents, faculty, and alumni that law school's primary goal was to
teach students to "think like a lawyer. '166 The subjects of a
second study, students at three law schools, reported that the
skills actually taught in law school were finding and using law
sources, knowing the legal steps and procedures to take in a
case, analyzing legal documents, and careful legal writing.167
The least-emphasized skills were determining client feelings
and attitudes, finding and using social science and other nonlaw
data, determining the likely personal or social effect of legal in-
tervention, and formulating a client's problem in nonlegal
terms.1 6
8
If the goal of law school is to teach students to think like
lawyers, it is not surprising that a year of law school encour-
ages responses that emphasize rules, objectives, and analytical
fact-finding, because legal thinking is rights thinking. Law stu-
dents are taught that people enter the legal system with certain
preexistent rights, and that disputes between people are re-
solved by rationally analyzing the facts of the dispute against
the background of those rights.
Law school also teaches students that rights must have
boundaries. Boundaries explain the limits of individual free-
dom, thus protecting individuals from invasion by others. Fur-
ther, law school teaches that rights are conceived as rules or
principles that operate abstractly. Students are taught to iden-
tify or create situational categories in order to sharpen their
ability to apply legal rules. The expression "learning to think
like a lawyer" is therefore synonymous with "learning to think
from a rights perspective."
Learning to "act like a lawyer" requires students to put
rights thinking into practice. Law students are taught that the
lawyer's role is to advocate their clients' rights. The adversary
role requires lawyers to be emotionally neutral about their cli-
ents' positions but steadfastly loyal to their clients' causes.
Lawyers pay less attention to the effect that their clients'
rights have on others than to their clients' ultimate success.
Attorneys also are professionally required to ignore their per-
166. Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551,
593 (1973).
167. SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 163, at 127.
168. Id.
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sonal feelings about their clients' causes. What happens, how-
ever, when a lawyer's personal morality and professional
responsibilities conflict? The system is structured such that
when role requirements are incongruent with personal moral-
ity, lawyers must subordinate their personal sensibilities to
their professional role.169
Law school also teaches problem-solving skills, fact analy-
sis, and abstract reasoning. Students in the study who em-
ployed rights thinking at the beginning of the first year did so
again at the end. In fact, their rights views were even stronger
at the end of the first year.
5. Question Five
Is there a significant difference between the care orientation of wo-
men and men at the end of their first year of law school?
The Sentence Completion Test data revealed that the car-
ing responses decreased overall after the first year of law
school, but that the changes in the women and men were signif-
icantly different. 70 Women's caring responses decreased signif-
icantly, but the men's responses exhibited no significant shift.
At the end of the first year of law school, there was no signifi-
cant difference in the care orientations of women and men.
The Interview data from the end of the year also showed
no significant relationship between gender and moral orienta-
tion.171 Women shifted in the direction of a rights construction
of real-life dilemmas, while the men exhibited no significant
169. See JACK & JACK, supra note 63, at 99-126.
170. Means and standard deviations on sentence stem response data were
computed. The women's mean care score was 44.18; the men's was 43.09. An
analysis of variance using care response scores resulted in a significant interac-
tion between gender and time (F (1, 198) = 37.68, p < .0001). Women demon-
strated a greater caring orientation than men at the beginning of the first year
of law school. The first year of law school produced changes in the caring re-
sponses of women and men that were significantly different. The women's
caring responses decreased, while the men's did not shift significantly. A t test
on women's mean care scores at the beginning and end of their first year
showed the decrease to be significant (female care response means, time 1 =
57.09, time 2 = 44.18, t(198) = 6.16, p < .0001). A t test on men's mean caring
scores at the beginning and end of their first year showed no significance in
the change (male care response means, time I = 39.79, time 2 = 43.09, t(198)
= -- 1.47, p = .144). Finally, a t test comparing men's and women's care orien-
tation at time 2 also showed no significant difference (t(1, 198) = .49, p -
.626).
171. At the end of the first year, a test of the interview data for signifi-
cance yielded chi-square (2, N = 30) = 3.96, p < .10. As this finding did not
meet the acceptable alpha level of .05, there was no association between gen-
der and moral orientation according to the interview data.
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shift.17 2
The decrease in care-oriented responses to the sentence
stems indicated that at the end of the school year, fewer wo-
men emphasized the needs of others, their own need to stay
connected to others, joy and satisfaction in relationships, and
knowledge and understanding of another's particular concerns.
The Interview data indicated that the care/rights distribution
shifted from nine women perceiving and resolving their real-
life dilemmas from a care perspective to seven women perceiv-
ing and resolving their dilemmas from a care perspective.
The finding from the Question Five data is congruent with
Jack and Jack's study that analyzed interview data from eight-
een female attorneys. 173 They found that a majority of their
subjects isolated their personal characteristics that were incom-
patible with the role of a lawyer and guarded against the result-
ing emotional struggle in one of two ways. Women in one
group denied the conflict, subordinating their personal lives to
their careers, and, for the most part, disavowing their emo-
tional, relational selves.' 74 The women in the other, larger
group split their orientations so that their affectionate sides
stayed at home and their stoic, detached sides came to the of-
fice.'7 5 The women used these defensive behaviors as protec-
tion against the anxiety caused by incompatibility.176 They
inevitably experienced disequilibrium and struggle.177 Women
in a third group hoped to reshape the lawyer's role and incorpo-
rate their caring responses into their work.178
In shifting from a predominantly care-oriented perspective
to a predominantly rights-oriented perspective, the women in
the study, were, like those in Jack and Jack's study, isolating
the characteristics in themselves that were dissonant with the
orientation of legal content and method. Although all first-
year law students experience some degree of disequilibrium
and anxiety, the emotional dissonance is likely to be far greater
for students (mostly female) who have a care perspective, yet
172. Among the women, there were two fewer interviews in the care focus
category, one fewer in the care-rights category, and an increase of three in the
rights focus category. Among the men, there was an increase of one in the
care-rights category and a decrease of one in the rights category.
173. JACK & JACK, supra note 63, at 130-55.
174. Id at 137-44.
175. Id. at 144-49.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. This type of woman, however, was rare. Only two of 18 adopted this
strategy. Id. at 149-55.
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are forced to accommodate to the gendered structure of legal
education. This is particularly true if the structure, in turn,
does not meet their emotional needs.
One solution for the anxiety engendered by incompatible
internal and external structures would be to attempt to influ-
ence the external structure. This would require care-oriented
law students to challenge gender bias, identify female norms,
and call for the profession to include female norms. The Ques-
tion Five finding does not show, however, that the women in
the first-year class are confronting institutional values. Rather,
it seems that the perspective they brought to law school was
submerged or denied within the traditional male perspective. 7 9
The Question Five finding also provides a preliminary and
disturbing response to the question feminist jurisprudents.have
been asking: Will women transform the legal profession or will
there just be more female lawyers?'8 0 The study demonstrates
that, despite the enormous increase in the numbers of women
entering law school, after one year of study, the care perspec-
tive is not significantly more prevalent in women than in men.
It may be that the pressure on law students to conform, and the
anxiety students face in advocating change in a firmly en-
trenched structure, has minimized some of the differences in
perspective that previously existed.
This analysis also suggests that the responses of male stu-
dents were consistent.1'' This finding is congruent with Jack
and Jack's study of lawyers' moral perspective 82 Jack and
Jack's interviewers asked subjects to provide general self de-
scriptions, relate real-life professional dilemmas, and respond
to legal hypotheticals. 8 3 The legal hypotheticals were created
to examine conflict between professional rules and harm to in-
dividuals.1' The women were predominantly care-oriented in
the general interview but shifted toward an expression of rights
concerns as the demands of their role as lawyers came into con-
flict with their personal perspective18s Conversely, the men
179. This core concern is discussed further in part IV. For the discussion of
the implications of this research for legal education, see infra part III.B.
180. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 62 (1985).
181. The change in men's perspective was in the direction of increased care
response but was insignificant, and thus could have happened by chance.
182. JACK & JACK, supra note 63, at 52-94.
183. Id at 53.
184. Id at 55.
185. Id-
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
expressed care and rights perspectives relatively consistently.186
Jack and Jack hypothesized that the male subjects' congruence
of personal and professional moral perspectives contributed to
minimal emotional anxiety and allowed them to express their
full range of responses.18 7 Anecdotal evidence confirms the
finding; a few individuals in this study reported that after a
year in law school, "the women still seem harassed, while the
men loosen up."
6. Question Six
Is there a significant difference between the rights orientation of wo-
men and men at the end of their first year of law school?
The sentence completion data revealed that after the first
year of law school, rights responses increased for the sample as
a whole, but that the increase in the women's rights responses
was significant, whereas the men's responses exhibited no sig-
nificant shift.1 88 At the end of the first year there was no sig-
nificant difference between the rights orientations of women
and men.
The Interview data also revealed no significant association
between gender and moral orientation at the end of the year,
although the women's distribution shifted in the direction of a
rights construction in real-life dilemmas. 8 9
The significant increase in rights-oriented responses to the
sentence stems indicated that at the end of the school year wo-
men were less likely to be oriented to the interconnectedness of
others. They also were more likely to regard individuals as sep-
186. Id. at 55.
187. Id.
188. Means and standard deviations on sentence stem response data were
computed. The women's mean rights score was 57.58; the men's was 58.64. An
analysis of variance using rights scores showed a significant interaction be-
tween gender and time (F (1, 198) = 39.16, p < .0001). Men were more rights-
oriented than women at the beginning of the first year of law school. The first
year, during which the rights responses of the sample as a whole increased,
resulted in significantly different changes in the female and male groups. Wo-
men's rights responses increased, while men's decreased. A t test on women's
rights responses, comparing mean scores at the beginning of the first year with
those at the end, showed that the increase was significant (women's rights re-
sponse means, time 1 = 44.38, time 2 = 57.58, t(198) = -6.40, p < .0001). A t
test on men's rights responses, also comparing beginning and end mean scores,
showed no significance in the decrease (men's rights response means, time 1 =
61.88, time 2 = 58.64, t(198) = 1.46, p = .145). Finally, a t test comparing
rights orientation means of men and women at time 2 also resulted in no sig-
nificant difference (t(1, 198) = -. 48, p = .631).
189. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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arate entities. In addition, women were more likely to rely on
principles for conflict resolution and to seek reasons for partic-
ular behaviors. The Interview data, as mentioned above, indi-
cated that females shifted in the direction of increased rights
construction.
The study's results prompted a colleague to inquire,
'What's the surprise? They go in like women and come out
like lawyers." Until fifteen years ago, law schools, including
Temple, were largely male-dominated institutions. Traditional
legal education incorporates norms, upholds rules, and rein-
forces a way of thinking that is primarily associated with a
rights perspective.
Women enter law school less rights-oriented than men and,
after one year of law school, significantly increase their use of
rights thinking. This finding implies that many women are
learning how to "talk like a (male) lawyer, think like a (male)
lawyer, and act like a (male) lawyer."'19 This observation, in
turn, implies that the legal profession still values male qualities
more highly than female qualities. Were the legal profession
not gender biased, all perspectives, emotional as well as ra-
tional, subjective as well as objective, would be accessible for
problem solving.
B. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
The study's results have several implications for legal edu-
cation. Gilligan has posited, in contrast to Kohlberg, that there
are two dimensions to moral maturity. When individuals see
themselves and others as different but connected, moral dilem-
mas are resolved by stepping into, not back from, the situation;
by assessing need; and by taking action based on that
knowledge.19 '
Gilligan also claims that the rights and care perspectives
are not mutually exclusive.19 2 Although both moral constructs
are available to women and men, each gender tends to use one
perspective predominantly. The important question for moral
theorists, therefore, is not how women and men think, but
when women and men use the different strategies of objective
and relational reasoning.
The study also supports Gilligan's conclusions. Prior to en-
tering the first year of law school, the students' gender and
190. JACK & JAK, supra note 63, at 136.
191. Lyons, supra note 141, at 42.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
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moral orientations tended to be linked. Both women and men
expressed distinct patterns of reasoning; women predominantly
focused on care while men predominantly focused on rights.
The results also emphasized the significant effect law
school had on women by highlighting their shift toward a rights
orientation after one year of law school. The shift appears to
be a response to the tension between conflicting professional
and personal moral orientations. The possibility exists, as Jack
and Jack hypothesized,193 that the male students' role expecta-
tions were congruent with their personal views, thus minimiz-
ing tension and allowing an authentic expression of their
feelings.
Women's care orientation is a new perspective in law
schools, and one which the schools have, the study suggests, ig-
nored. The challenge for legal education is to recognize the va-
lidity of care orientation and value the moral decision-making
process generally associated with women. Is the adversarial
model the only route to dispute resolution? Is a highly compet-
itive learning environment the best way to educate students?
Would law schools serve their purposes better by integrating a
perspective of responsiveness? Why is there resistance to in-
cluding the full range of mature moral sensibility and personal
judgment in legal training?
The integration of care and rights thinking requires educa-
tors to change the traditional structure of legal education, not
just assimilate women within the existing structure. Those in
power must be willing to integrate competing perspectives. A
growing number of legal scholars are questioning how and
when legal education will reject the sexual discrimination be-
tween the putative dualisms of human behavior-i.e., thinking
and feeling, objectivity and subjectivity, reason and emotion.
Frances Olsen, in her essay on feminist jurisprudence strate-
gies, recognized that sometimes "[it is rational to be irrational
and objectivity is necessarily subjective."'194 She also explained
that, while the law has been dominated by men, the legal sys-
tem has obscured, but not eliminated, traits associated with wo-
men.195 In practice, law "is as irrational, subjective, concrete,
and contexualized as it is rational, objective, abstract, and
principled.' 196
193. JACK & JACK, supra note 63, at 55.
194. Olsen, supra note 155, at 459.
195. Id at 462.
196. Id
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Feminist critics of law school education seek changes in
content, teaching style, and relationships within the law school.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her informative account of the femi-
nist critique of legal education, insists that a case such as Roe v.
Wade is not an "abstract discussion of the autonomous logical
development of the constitutional right of privacy, but a specific
sociopolitical and human story that affects real women."197
From a care perspective, therefore, law should consider real
human experience in analyzing case context.
Law professors Michael Burns,198 Kenneth Karst,1' and
Catherine Hantzis200 echoed Menkel-Meadow's criticism. "Con-
textual morality," declares Burns, "can be translated into law
without violating the 'rule of law.' "201 Karst asserts that con-
textual facts must be "legally irrelevant but morally central" if
we are to "widen inquiry, redefine issues, [and] expand the
range of possible solutions. '202 The ability to explore new ave-
nues of inquiry is the essence of creativity, both legal and
nonlegal.20 3
Integrating a perspective of care also explodes the notion
that student-teacher relationships must be hierarchical, formal,
distant, and authoritarian in order to be effective. Genuine
classroom dialogue that includes feelings and feedback, not just
disembodied facts and intimidating probes, would likely
"broaden the quality and type[s] of responses to legal
problems."' 204 Further, feminists advocate a classroom struc-
ture that supports shared leadership, risk-taking, trust, and
cooperation.
As long as law school training aligns with objective neu-
197. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 81.
198. Michael Burns, The Law School as a Model for Community, 10 NOVA
L.J. 329, 379 (1986).
199. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 499.
200. Catherine Hantzis, Kingsfteld and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male
Models of Law School Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1988).
201. Burns, supra note 198, at 379.
202. Karst, supra note 199, at 499.
203. An indicator that legal education is beginning to seek models other
than the win/lose courtroom battle of conflict resolution is the growing
number of alternative dispute resolution courses in law school curriculums.
204. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 78. Menkel-Meadow looks at Gilli-
gan's example of how Amy and Jake-the voice of care and the voice of
rights-respond differently to the same dilemma. While Jake's response is the
conventional objective response that is both expected and rewarded in tradi-
tional law school classrooms, Amy "fights the hypothetical," wanting to know
more facts and even having the parties talk directly to one another, thus intro-
ducing another equally valid view of conflict resolution. Id.
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trality, adversarial competition, and hierarchy, the care per-
spective will be excluded. Mainstream legal education,
however, is not the only stream.20 5 Legal education, educa-
tional theory, and developmental psychology are ships that pass
in the night, but they carry the same cargo, points out professor
Paul Wangarin, an advocate for dialogue between the disci-
plines of law and psychology.20 6 Wangarin urges future re-
searchers to evaluate law students in light of Gilligan's work.20 7
This study is a step in that direction.
Jack and Jack's research provided evidence that "attorneys
with a strong moral orientation of care will have the ,primary
responsibility for instituting change" in the legal profession.20 8
They found a correlation between care-oriented attorneys and
women trying to reshape the traditional lawyer role.20 9 There
are few such attorneys, however, and, as this study demon-
strated, law school education silences the care voice. Thus, the
hope that women will shift the tide once they become practic-
ing attorneys seems remote.
The most obvious effect of the study is to cast doubt on the
assumption that the increasing number of female lawyers will
change the legal profession. The movement toward morally re-
sponsible advocacy must begin in law school and with legal edu-
cators. Law schools train some of the brightest, most skilled,
most ambitious, and most potentially influential citizens in soci-
ety. The law school curriculum therefore must set the standard
for its profession and for society at large. One scholar has
urged:
We must train our students to deal with other human beings, to un-
derstand that when a client comes into a lawyer's office he is often in
pain .... [M]e as teachers must let our students know that we value
them, and not only for their intellectual abilities. For unless we, as
lawyers, acknowledge and value the compassionate qualities within
ourselves, we will be incapable of caring about the human needs of
others.
2 10
Women, for both cultural and psychological reasons, are
the primary voice of the care perspective. The care perspective,
205. See Paul Wangarin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in De-
velopmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1240-41
(1988) (exploring the fundamental dispute bdtween objective and relative
truth in both psychology and legal education).
206. Id. at 1299.
207. Id.
208. JACK & JACK, supra note 63, at 157.
209. Id. at 157-58.
210. Burns, supra note 198, at 384.
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however, is not exclusive to women, nor should it be perceived
as such. The emotional cost of change is high. It creates ambi-
guity which, in turn, causes enormous anxiety-the fear of the
unknown. However, the cost of resisting change is higher.
Should legal education remain unchanged, the cost will go be-
yond psychological dissonance in the care-oriented student; it
will extend to the profession, the client, and society.
IV. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although these findings are restricted to one class of stu-
dents at one large, urban law school, the results generate sev-
eral important questions for future study. First, the study
initiated research into the relationship among a moral orienta-
tion of rights, care, and legal education. As these findings are
preliminary, further investigation of student populations at
other schools is warranted. A study using students from more
than one law school would broaden the range of data.
Second, the study suggests that female law students use
coping strategies that influence their views of themselves and
their relationships. Research that expands this finding could be
useful in combatting the psychological effects of women's cop-
ing strategies.
The study also underscores the need to include women in
all research on legal education. Research that is more than
eight years old reflects nearly all-male samples. In addition,
there is a need for more studies, or repeat studies, that take wo-
men's experiences as students in law school into account. A
study that identifies the care-oriented incoming students and
studies their experiences throughout the year would be particu-
larly valuable. Such a study would identify factors that contrib-
ute to the shift to a rights orientation.
The study was not a longitudinal exploration of the three
years of law school experience. The change that was measured
took place after one year. What takes place after the second
and third years of law school is still unknown; research on the
effect of the second and third year is, as yet, unavailable.
CONCLUSION
This study found that after one year of law school, women
are more likely to resolve moral dilemmas by a rights-oriented
approach. In the study's sample, women and men revealed sig-
nificantly different response patterns at the beginning of the
year but showed no significant difference at the end of the year.
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This was true for both sources of data, the Sentence Comple-
tion Test and the Real-Life Moral Conflict and Choice
Interview.
Women enter law school predominantly oriented to the
web of interpersonal relationships rather than to a hierarchy of
abstract principles. However, after one year of learning about a
structure that emphasizes rights and rules within a learning en-
vironment that is congruent with that content, women express
their connectedness to others less frequently but their objectiv-
ity and separateness more frequently. Thus, female law stu-
dents are "trained for hierarchy."2 11
The study showed that legal education is more aligned with
the way men think than with the way women do and alters the
way women think. The voice of rights and the voice of care are
two complementary themes, both embracing truths about the
human condition. Continued suppression of the voice of care
will block the harmony of a fully human response.
An integrated legal education and practice can occur only if
there is extensive dialogue between these two perspectives.
This dialogue has already begun with the feminist critique of
legal education. Feminist jurisprudence criticizes hierarchy and
encourages law schools to include women's experiences and
perspective. It also calls for legal educators to revise their as-
sumptions about the legal system. Feminist scholars further in-
sist that law schools refrain from ranking and sexualizing the
dualisms of human experience. Continued investigation and
exploration will extend the dialogue and encourage law schools
to fulfill their missions and incorporate the resources of men
and women.
211. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRMTIQUE 38, 38 (David Kairys ed., rev.
ed. 1990) (asserting that law schools conduct "ideological training for willing
service in the corporate welfare state").
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